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Nos. 99-1257, 99-1263, 99-1265, 99-1426, 99-1431, 99-1442

In The Supreme Court of the United States

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Conditional Cross-Petitioners,

v.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Conditional Cross-Respondents.

On Conditional Cross-Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

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BRIEF OF STATE RESPONDENTS IN SUPPORT OF ATA AND CAA INDUSTRY'S CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONS

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of Ohio
EDWARD B. FOLEY
State Solicitor
JUDITH L. FRENCH*
ELISE W. PORTER
FRANK J. REED, JR.
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
30 East Broad Street, 17th Flr.
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
(614) 466-2872
Counsel for Respondent State of Ohio

*Counsel of Record

[Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover]

22pp

MARK J. RUDOLPH
Deputy Chief
Office of Legal Services
West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection
1356 Hansford Street
Charleston, West Virginia 25301
(304) 558-9160
Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General of Michigan
THOMAS CASEY
Solicitor General
ALAN F. HOFFMAN
PAMELA J. STEVENSON
Assistant Attorneys General
Natural Resources Division
300 S. Washington, Suite 315
Lansing, Michigan 48917
(517) 373-7540
Counsel for Respondent State of Michigan

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the Environmental Protection Agency must, in setting national air quality standards, ignore all factors "other than health effects relating to pollutants in the air," given that consideration of such factors would permit both the Agency and reviewing courts to avoid confronting constitutional nondelegation issues.

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Appalachian Power Company, et al. and American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. ("CAA Industry and ATA conditional cross-petitioners" or "conditional cross-petitioners") have submitted Conditional Cross-Petitions in this case, which arises from petitions for writ of certiorari to review *American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. U.S. EPA*, 175 F.3d 1027, *modified*, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Conditional Cross-Petitions concern the scope of authority of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA" or "the Agency") to promulgate or revise a National Ambient Air Quality Standard ("NAAQS" or "standard") under the Clean Air Act ("CAA" or "the Act"). At issue in EPA's petition is whether the Act as construed by EPA creates an excessive delegation of rulemaking authority. The conditional cross-petitioners argue that, if the Court grants review to consider the delegation issue, the Court should also review the related question whether the statute has been properly construed to prevent EPA from considering the costs, as well as the benefits, of regulation.

Respondent States of Michigan and West Virginia oppose question one, and all three Respondent States oppose questions two and three of EPA's petition for certiorari. *See*, Respondent States' Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Certiorari. At the same time, however, Respondent States agree with conditional cross-petitioners' Conditional Cross-Petitions, urging this Court, if it grants certiorari on any of these questions, to also grant certiorari on the issue of whether EPA is authorized to consider factors other than health in setting or revising a standard under Section 109(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409(b); EPA App. 111a. [1]

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[1] Respondent States of Ohio, Michigan and West Virginia do not support the cross-petition of Citizens for Balanced Transport.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONS

The Clean Air Act provides that the only mechanism for review of ambient air standards is to petition in the District of Columbia Circuit. CAA §307(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Review by this Court is, therefore, the only procedure by which to correct a long-standing erroneous decision by the District of Columbia Circuit on EPA's consideration of costs in setting ambient standards under the Clean Air Act. In addition, a correct interpretation of EPA's authority under the Act will avoid altogether the need to reach the nondelegation issue in the first question presented of EPA's petition.

The case below represents the latest in a line of cases from the D.C. Circuit, following *Lead Industries Ass'n. v. U.S. EPA*, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980)("*Lead Industries*"), and holding that the EPA is bereft of discretion to consider the social, economic and environmental costs of, as well as the public health benefits of, a standard under Section 109. *Lead Industries* was wrongly decided, primarily because the language of Section 109 and related sections indicates that EPA has the authority to consider factors other than health when setting an air standard. Under Section 109, "ambient air quality standards" are set, "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such *criteria* and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1); EPA App. 111a (emphasis supplied). The word "criteria" refers to Section 108; Section 108(a) includes a non-exclusive list of factors for setting criteria, and Section 108(b) requires EPA to collect information on cost and technological feasibility simultaneously with establishing a standard. In addition, Congress's direction in Section 109(d)(1) that EPA revise standards "as may be appropriate" in accordance with

Section 109(b) and Section 108, gives EPA discretion to consider factors such as costs. Finally, Section 109(d)(2)(c) requires an "independent scientific review committee" to advise the Administrator of any "adverse public health, welfare, social, economic or energy effects" that may result from revision of a standard. *Lead Industries* and its progeny were, therefore, wrongly decided.

In fact, the *Lead Industries* line of cases, including the case below, seemingly contradicts other cases from the District of Columbia Circuit interpreting other, similar provisions of the Act, as well as other administrative decisions. *See Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. U.S. EPA*, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("*NOx SIP call*"); *Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA*, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("*Vinyl Chloride*"). This Court can correct that conflict.

But perhaps most important to the Respondent States, this Court must overrule the D.C. Circuit's erroneous holding because its (and EPA's) interpretation of Section 109 potentially puts the States into an impossible box. Sections 108 and 110 of the Act, under recent D.C. Circuit decisions, *require* the States to consider economic and technological feasibility when implementing a standard for non-threshold pollutants, but the lower court's interpretation of Section 109 in this case *precludes* EPA from doing so. 175 F.3d at 1041; EPA App. 20a-21a. This interpretation creates a potential impasse between EPA and the States in implementing an air standard. The EPA, armed with complete discretion over a non-threshold pollutant and unable to consider economic or technological feasibility, could set a standard that its own data might demonstrate is realistically impossible for the States to achieve when cost and available technology are considered.

In order to resolve this impasse, if the Court grants certiorari in one or more of the petitions submitted in this case, it should also grant certiorari to the Conditional Cross-Petitions of the CAA Industry and ATA conditional cross-petitioners. In addition, the proper interpretation of Section 109 will preclude consideration of the delegation issue.

A. The Court Should Avoid Consideration Of The Non-Delegation Issue By Resolving The Statutory Cost-Benefit Issue.

As this Court has made clear on numerous occasions, it is the "settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question." *Gomez v. United States*, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989); *Ashwander v. TVA*, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring). This case presents just such a situation. As demonstrated below, if the Court grants certiorari on the first question presented in EPA's petition, it should resolve the case by granting and resolving the issue presented in the Conditional Cross-Petitions, and avoiding the constitutional nondelegation issue presented by EPA.

The lower court correctly found that EPA has failed to find an "intelligible principle" for selecting a standard for ozone.[2] 175 F.3d at 1034; EPA App. 5a. It therefore correctly remanded the revised standard to the EPA "to give the agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own." 175 F.3d at 1038; EPA App. 14a. However, in

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[2] The Respondent States focus here on the ozone standard. However, most of the statements made for ozone apply equally to the standard for coarse and fine particulate matter ($PM_{2.5}$ and PM_{10}). *See, e.g.*, 62 *Fed. Reg.* at 38,688 (July 18, 1997) (PM); 62 *Fed. Reg.* at 38,883 (July 18, 1997) (ozone); Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair CASAC, to Hon. Carol M. Browner (Nov. 30, 1995), Ozone JA 237, *OAQPS Staff Paper*, PMJA 2068.

so doing, it was constrained by *Lead Industries* to deny EPA the one tool that would most help the Agency in selecting an ozone standard: cost-benefit analysis.

Ozone is a "non-threshold" pollutant; that is, there is no threshold amount, above which deleterious health effects are certain, and below which no or few health effects are known. As the lower court stated, "EPA regards ozone definitely, and PM likely, as non-threshold pollutants, i.e. ones that have some possibility of some adverse health impact (however slight) at any exposure level above zero." 175 F.3d at 1034 (EPA App. 5a), citing Ozone Final Rule, 62 *Fed. Reg.* at 38,863/3 (July 18, 1997). *See also Vinyl Chloride*, 824 F.2d at 1148 (a "non-threshold" pollutant is one which "appears to create a risk to health at all non-zero levels of emission"). *Cf. Lead Industries*, 647 F.2d at 1137-41 (discussing various thresholds for lead exposure used to support the air standard for lead). The court below also noted that "the only concentration for ozone . . . that is utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero." 175 F.3d at 1034; EPA App. 6a.

In the absence of a health threshold for a pollutant, it is not surprising that EPA has difficulty articulating an "intelligible principle" based on health alone for its ozone standard, as *any* presence of the pollutant presents some threat to health. As the lower court stated, all the relevant variables related to health with regard to ozone "seem to range continuously from high to low." 175 F.3d at 1039; EPA App. 16a. Despite this acknowledgment, the lower court insists that EPA should be able to develop some health-based principle by which a standard can be developed. 175 F.3d at 1039; EPA App. 16a. And, also despite this acknowledgment, the lower court insists on its interpretation of Section 109(b), first articulated in *Lead Industries*, that EPA is barred from considering any factor other than health. 175 F.3d at 1038; EPA App. 14a-15a.

Ironically, the model suggested by the D.C. Circuit for EPA's use in "building blocks for a principled structure" is the Oregon plan for health care for the poor. This plan involves a ranking of treatments by a measure of the amount of improvement in health *divided by the cost of the treatment.* 175 F.3d at 1039; EPA App. 16a-17a. In other words, the principal model suggested by the lower court for EPA to follow in developing an "intelligible principle" for the ozone standard is itself a cost-benefit analysis.

Another alternative suggested by the lower court is for EPA to "report to Congress, along with such rationales as it has for the levels it chose, and seek legislation ratifying its choice." *Id.*; EPA App. 18a. And indeed, if *Lead Industries* is correct, returning to Congress may be EPA's only legal alternative.

The interpretation of Section 109(b) of the Act suggested by EPA and supported by the lower court logically requires only one of two equally untenable results. The first is that EPA has no discretion and must set the standard for a non-threshold pollutant at zero. The second is that because no factor other than direct health effects can be considered, EPA has complete discretion to select any standard for a non-threshold pollutant. 175 F.3d at 1038; EPA App. 14a.

The first possible result of the lower court's interpretation of Section 109 for a non-threshold pollutant is both untenable and inconsistent with Congress's intent. If health is truly the only factor to be considered, then the only way to prevent any risk of direct adverse health effects is to set the standard at zero. "Thus the only concentration for ozone and PM that is utterly risk-free, in the sense of direct health impacts, is zero." 175 F. 3d at 1034; EPA App. 5a.

Of course, consideration of health as a criterion does not necessarily mean that the concentration chosen should be "utterly risk free." But "for EPA to pick any non-zero level it must explain the degree of imperfection permitted." 175 F.3d at 1034; EPA App. 6a. All of EPA's stated criteria are vague references to "the nature and severity" of health effects, "the size of the sensitive populations at risk," and the "kind and degree of uncertainties that must be addressed." 175 F.3d at 1034-35; EPA App. 6a-7a, citing Ozone Final Rule, 62 *Fed. Reg.* at 38,883/2.

Aside from their vagueness, these factors do not provide a principled method for drawing a line identifying a level of air quality that is "requisite" to protect the "public health." How many deaths or adverse affects in the "sensitive population" is EPA willing to tolerate in the name of "public health"? How severe must a "health effect" be for EPA to consider it in setting a NAAQS designed to protect the "public health"? If direct health risks alone are to be considered, there simply is no principled way to draw a line, below which the effects are acceptable from a "public health" standpoint, and above which they are not. As a consequence, if factors other than direct health effects may not be considered, it is impossible to articulate or discern an intelligible principle for establishing a standard, at any level other than zero, for a non-threshold pollutant.

EPA's NAAQS determinations, as with all agency determinations, are subject to judicial review under the standard articulated in *Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). CAA §307(b)(1), (d)(1), (s); 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), (d)(1), (s); EPA App. 120a-21a. Under a non-zero-risk regime with direct health risk as the only criterion, EPA must pull a number out of thin air in setting a standard for ozone. As there is complete discretion in setting a standard under this theory, it is impossible for EPA to commit an abuse of discretion. This renders the standard

essentially unreviewable by the courts. Although the *Chevron* analysis is deferential to administrative agencies, it does not allow the agency complete and unreviewable discretion in its interpretation of acts of Congress.

The dilemma produced by *Lead Industries* and EPA's standardless assertion of authority is what led the D.C. Circuit to invoke the nondelegation doctrine. As the ATA conditional cross-petitioners pointed out, the D.C. Circuit was bound by the *Lead Industries* precedent to preclude EPA's consideration of cost under Section 109, and the only alternative is permitting EPA a boundless (and therefore unconstitutional) discretion. This Court is not bound by *Lead Industries*, and can resolve the case without reaching the nondelegation doctrine, by construing Section 109 to permit consideration of other factors.

B. This Court Should Resolve The Impasse Created For EPA And The States By The District of Columbia Circuit's Holding That EPA Cannot Consider Costs When Setting A NAAQS.

The lower court's decision also places the States in a potentially impossible position. Under the Act, after EPA sets a standard for a particular pollutant, each State is required to develop a state implementation plan ("SIP") for that pollutant. CAA §110; 42 U.S.C. 7410. Indeed, the State is primarily responsible for enforcing a standard. CAA §107; 42 U.S.C. 7407. EPA is required to gather and issue to the States:

> information on air pollution control techniques, which information shall include data relating to the cost of installation and operation, energy requirements, emission reduction benefits, and environmental impact of the emission control technology.

CAA §108(b); 42 U.S.C. 7408(b). In other words, EPA is to gather and provide data to the States on the economic and technological costs of implementing the standard. The lower court has held that this provision of Section 108 does not require or allow EPA to consider costs and benefits in setting a standard. 175 F.3d at 1041; EPA App. 20a.

If this interpretation is correct, then EPA is free to set the standard for a particular pollutant without considering its cost and EPA could set a standard that in practical terms, is impossible to implement because of its costs. The States would be left "holding the bag": required to attain the standard by a specific deadline through their implementation plans, while considering costs of implementation, but faced with an arbitrarily-set and non-cost-effective standard.

This Court's review is necessary to alleviate the potential for the States to be placed in an untenable position under this regime--a regime that forces States to impose controls to abate theoretical health risks without promoting the "public health" of its population.

C. This Court Should Reconcile The Conflicting Holdings By The District Of Columbia Circuit Regarding An Administrative Agency's Authority To Consider Factors Not Mentioned Explicitly In The Enabling Legislation.

Under Section 109(b) of the Act, the EPA is to set air standards "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 42 U.S.C. 7409(b). Once a standard is set, the EPA must review it periodically, and revise it as appropriate under Sections 108 and 109(b).

The D.C. Circuit first considered the scope of EPA's authority with regard to the language of Section 109(b) in *Lead Industries*. In *Lead Industries*, the court reviewed the contention by petitioners in that case that the EPA was *required* by the language of the statute to consider economic and technological feasibility in setting air quality standards for lead. 647 F.2d 1148. However, the court went beyond what was necessary to decide that issue, and held that not only was EPA not *required* to consider economic and technological factors, but that it was *precluded* from doing so. 647 F.2d 1148.

The erroneous dictum has been cited on several occasions since *Lead Industries*, and indeed expanded since *Lead Industries*, to preclude EPA from using a number of factors in determining a standard. For instance, the D.C. Circuit held that in setting the standard for particulate matter, the EPA was precluded from considering the health consequences of unemployment. *National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA*, 902 F.2d 962, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In addition, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA could not consider attainability and cost justifications for ozone standards. *American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle*, 665 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And in dicta, the D.C. Circuit stated that §109 does "not allow consideration of technological or economic feasibility." *Vinyl Chloride*, 824 F.2d at 1158-59.

The *Lead Industries* rationale was that where Congress did not expressly and specifically provide for consideration of cost or other factors, an agency was forbidden from considering it. 647 F.2d at 1148. To be sure, the courts have correctly held that where statutory language articulates the factors relevant to an agency's decision, the agency may not base its decision on other, irrelevant factors. For example, in *Union Electric Co. v. U.S. EPA*, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), the Court found that a provision enumerating

eight criteria for consideration did not authorize consideration of other criteria. *Id.* at 257. Similarly, in *American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. EPA*, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the lower court struck down EPA's decision to include the goal of ethanol market protection in its promulgation of regulations under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545, a goal that could "possibly make air quality worse." According to the court, considering this goal as the basis for the regulation did not square with the statutory mandate to adopt performance standards that reduce pollution. And in *Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. EPA*, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the D.C. Circuit held that EPA's decision to deny a waiver based on health considerations (rather than the statutorily-required criterion of whether an additive caused or contributed to the failure of an emission control device) was impermissible. *See also NOx SIP call*, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209, *93 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).

In contrast, broad statutory language directing EPA to adopt rules that protect the "public health" with an "adequate margin of safety," and directing EPA to revise standards as may be "appropriate," does not preclude consideration of any factor. Thus, another line of D.C. Circuit cases holds that an agency can consider costs if not expressly precluded from doing so by statutory language. For instance, in *Vinyl Chloride*, 824 F.2d at 1155, 1163, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 112, 42 U.S.C. 7412, which requires EPA to set an air quality standard for hazardous pollutants with an "ample margin of safety" to protect the public health, did not preclude a consideration of costs. And in *George E. Warren Corp. v. U.S. EPA*, 159 F.3d 616, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit allowed EPA to consider the effects of a proposed rule on the price and supply of gasoline because there was nothing in the text or structure of the statute to preclude it. In *Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA*, 154 F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the FAA was permitted to consider costs in its plan for

"substantial restoration of the natural quiet," even though costs were not mentioned in the statute. And in *National Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA*, 937 F.2d 641, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C. Circuit allowed EPA to use a cost-benefit analysis in determining whether fugitive dust from coal mines should count in identifying "major" contributors to "significant deterioration" under Sections 160 *et seq.*, despite the lack of statutory language mentioning costs. As the D.C. Circuit observed only this month in *NOx SIP call*, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3209 at *36-40, "[t]hese cases are unexceptional in their general view that preclusion of cost consideration requires a rather express congressional direction."[3]

Therefore, in contradiction to the rationale in the *Lead Industries* line of cases, the rationale in *Vinyl Chloride* and similar cases is that where Congress does not enact statutory language that precludes it, and where Congress in fact enacts statutory language (*e.g.*, "ample margin of safety") that opens the door to cost considerations, an administrative agency can consider cost. And where an agency is confronted with cost arguments, and it has discretion to consider them, it cannot lawfully ignore them. Indeed, there is no principled reason why Section 109(b) cannot be analyzed under *Vinyl Chloride* and similar cases, rather than under the erroneous *Lead Industries* test. Several of the cited cases involve similar statutory structures: "a mandate directed to some environmental benefit," "phrased in general quantitative terms," "and contain[ing] not a word alluding to non-health trade-offs." Section 109 fits comfortably into this structure. The language at issue in Section 109 is as follows:

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[3] Respondent States were among those who challenged EPA's *NOx SIP call* rule by asserting, among other claims, that costs were inappropriately considered in the determination of significant contribution.

> National primary ambient air quality standards, prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and *allowing an adequate margin of safety*, are requisite to protect the public health.

42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)(emphasis added); EPA App. 111a. The examples of mandates "phrased in general quantitative terms" given by the court in *NOx SIP call* include "ample margin of safety," "substantial restoration" and "major." The mandate in Section 109(b), "an adequate margin of safety," is virtually identical to "ample margin of safety" cited by the D.C. Circuit in *NOx SIP call* and analyzed by that court in *Vinyl Chloride*. Like *Vinyl Chloride* and similar cases, Section 109(b) itself does not, on its face, preclude consideration of factors other than health. Therefore, under the rationale of *Vinyl Chloride* and similar cases, Section 109(b) allows EPA to consider cost in setting a standard, because Congress has not expressly forbidden it, while under the rationale of *Lead Industries* and progeny, Section 109(b) precludes EPA from considering cost in setting a standard because Congress does not expressly allow it.

Lead Industries simply cannot be reconciled with the *Vinyl Chloride* line of cases regarding the authority of an administrative agency to consider a factor not expressly mentioned in the statutory language. Given the D.C. Circuit's reluctance to overturn *Lead Industries*, or otherwise reconcile its own jurisprudence, and the potential for avoiding the nondelegation issue, this conflict should be resolved by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Conditional Cross-Petitions if it grants certiorari on any form of the first question presented in EPA's petition.

Respectfully submitted,

BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of Ohio
EDWARD B. FOLEY
State Solicitor
JUDITH L. FRENCH*
ELISE W. PORTER
FRANK J. REED, JR.
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
30 East Broad Street, 17th Flr.
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
(614) 466-2872
Counsel for Respondent State of Ohio

*Counsel of Record

[Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page]

MARK J. RUDOLPH
Deputy Chief
Office of Legal Services
West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection
1356 Hansford Street
Charleston, West Virginia 25301
(304) 558-9160
Counsel for Respondent State of West Virginia

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM
Attorney General of Michigan
THOMAS CASEY
Solicitor General
ALAN F. HOFFMAN
PAMELA J. STEVENSON
Assistant Attorneys General
Natural Resources Division
300 S. Washington, Suite 315
Lansing, Michigan 48917
(517) 373-7540
Counsel for Respondent State of Michigan